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Shifting to All-Volunteer Armed
Forces in Europe: Why, How, With
What Effects?
Bernard Boene
1 When the Cold War ended, only four European countries had all-volunteer forces (AVF):
Ireland,  Luxembourg,  Malta  and,  most  importantly,  the  United  Kingdom.  Soon
afterwards,  Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  France,  Spain,  Italy  and  Portugal  ended
conscription in a quick succession. As of today, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia have followed suit,
or announced their intention to do so by 2010. As a result, those states which have opted
to retain the draft are now a shrinking minority. Germany, for reasons to be detailed
infra, is one of them. Scandinavian nations likewise resist the trend. The rest are small
neutral countries in the heart of the continent, and various peripheral nations that are
either facing unresolved conflict or still  feel  threatened. One Swiss expert declared a
decade ago that he could see a future in which all countries of Europe – possibly with the
exception of Finland, Greece, and (though he was not too sure…) Switzerland, plus Turkey
if it is included in the area considered – would go all-volunteer in the first decades of the
new century.
2 The present article’s ambition is to examine the reasons behind such a major change, the
circumstances  in  which  it  was  conducted,  and  its  various  impacts.  Although  it  is
sometimes  very  difficult  to  disentangle  the  specific  effects  of  the  newly  dominant
organizational  format  from the  wider  influence  of  the  (strategic  and  socio-political)
contexts in which it has come about, a serious attempt to do so will be made. 
3 There can be little question of going into the details of each and every country’s case. Nor
would the use of an average case make much sense. As comparative methodologists know,
the study of common denominators is apt to yield few or disappointing results. Instead,
the analysis to follow will proceed in terms of the context, the reasons and outcomes of
the logics at work, based on the specification of trends observed in countries with “old”
or “new” AVF (notably though not exclusively Britain and France), on which data are in
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the public domain and abundant. It is left to the reader interested in a particular country
to assess, in Weberian fashion, the causes of possible deviations from the hypothetical
model presented below.
 
Why? 
4 In the face of the bandwagon effect outlined by way of introduction, the obvious aim of
this study is to analyse the reasons behind the choice of all-volunteer forces. In fact, AVF
may be regarded as the ultimate and logical culmination of a major trend dating back to
the 1960s: the decline, so aptly described and analysed early on by Morris Janowitz, of the
mass mobilization model (Janowitz, 1971 [1960]; Doorn, 1975; Martin, 1977, 1981; Kelleher,
1978; Burk, 1992). Two decades into the Cold War, it had indeed become clear that nuclear
weapons made a major hot war unlikely to occur, though not impossible, on the continent
of  Europe  technology  had  rendered  large  numbers  of  troops  unnecessary  on  the
battlefield anyway and that serving in the army was now regarded by citizens as a burden
– a practical nuisance for students and young adults with family plans – rather than an
honour. Therefore, the impact of conscription on societies, which had been so strong for
some eight decades and through two world wars, began to wane. Where it had shallow
historical roots, as in Britain, it was abolished immediately (1957-1962). In most other
European countries, while less dramatic, the change was nonetheless real. Reserve forces
began  to  erode  steadily,  soon  followed  by  active-duty  force  level  requirements;  the
proportion of enlisted volunteers started rising, and the length of compulsory service in
uniform decreased by stages to the point – in the late seventies and eighties – where it
was so short as to make it appear ineffective. Exemptions from conscript duty became
widespread, and legal evasion was no longer frowned upon: with declining manpower
requirements, defence establishments could no longer provide meaningful roles for the
large age cohorts of baby-boomers now of military age. Gone for good was the charisma of
the nation-state, premised on grandeur and national honour; it was replaced by economic
prosperity and welfare, hedonism and cultural permissiveness as central values, which
resulted in weakening citizenship norms and patriotism. With the media, welfare systems
and long years of generalized public education now providing effective substitutes for it,
the “school-of-the-nation” uses of conscript service for socio-political integration went
out of fashion. The old social or welfare uses of conscription were no longer needed, and
military service as a second educational chance for school drop-outs was rendered unreal
by its now very short length.
5 Finally, the arguments of relative deprivation weakened the legitimacy of conscription
among youths of draft age. The issue of who shall serve when not all serve, and increasing
shares of successive age-cohorts legally evade service, acted like a powerful corrosive. If
to the question “why me?”1, the answer no longer is “because serving under arms is a
citizen’s  duty  obeyed  by  all  except  for  a  few  justifiable  health  or  family  reasons”,
attitudes towards service – all things equal2 – are bound to deteriorate. 
6 The post-Cold War era has only radicalized these trends. For one thing, with the clear and
present danger of confrontation between coalitions of East and West now absent from the
scene, invasion defence plans were shelved. The social discipline that they involved soon
appeared no longer sustainable.  For another,  while military action – which for three
decades had been so scarce for European forces – has become more plentiful, it was to
begin with (throughout the 1990s) mostly concerned with collective security: coercion of
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international deviants (Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Slobodan Milosevic’s Serbia), and dozens
of peace support efforts on distant theatres of operations. These are types of military
action for which conscripted troops are ill-adapted, because (a) draftees are normally
destined  for  defence  of  the  national  territory,  (b)  such  complex  operations  require
professional  skills,  and (c)  conscript  casualties,  however  rare,  are  bound to generate
negative  political  fall-out  at  home  whenever  the  stakes  are  deemed  of  secondary
importance  by  public  opinion.  In  the  present decade,  the  re-emergence  of  war,  in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and the participation of troops from a number of European nations
has only served to confirm the functional and political disutility of conscripts.
7 Another significant factor was the lack of credible and unproblematic alternatives to the
existing  conscription  systems.  Old-style  lotteries  are  seldom judged adequate  today3:
while they ensure ex ante equality of treatment, they still  result in ex post inequality. 
Selective  military  service,  usually  accompanied  by  compensation  in  the  form  of
immediate (pay) or postponed advantages (tax exemptions, reserved jobs in public
service, etc.) for those who do serve, is much more plausible on paper. The drawback is
that such schemes are complex, hence opaque and hard to read: for that reason, very few
countries have elected to follow that road.
8 A third solution would consist in maintaining universal conscription and funnel those
whose services are not used by the active-duty forces into a national guard in charge of
securing  national  territory  against  various  threats.  The  problem here  is  that  such a
scheme is costly – it implies that a large fraction of the officer corps is diverted from
operational duty in order to train and supervise conscripts – and the threats that might
have justified it in the 1990s were mostly hypothetical, thus likely to turn national guard
service  into  make-work.  The  emergence  of  terrorism  in  the  present  decade  hardly
changed the equation as draftees cannot effectively cope with it. 
9 The final answer often considered by would-be reformers consists in instituting civilian
forms  of  universal  national  service,  German  style,  in  order  to  absorb  the  excess
manpower provided by age-cohorts that far surpass the armed forces’ needs. This is often
legitimized  in  terms  of  fulfilling  social  needs  which  the  market  (due  to  recipient
insolvency) or public bureaucracies (unable to finance such services at market rates) fail
to  meet.  The  reason  why  Germany  retains  conscription  is  basically  that  if  it  were
abolished, conscientious objection would be deprived of meaningful justification4,  and
would cease to channel hundreds of thousands of young males each year into the civilian
forms of youth national service on which the country’s welfare system extensively relies.
While it may sound like a good idea, this solution comes in for a number of criticisms.
First,  economists  are  apt  to  see  it  as  far  less  than  optimal  in  terms  of  manpower
allocation.  Second,  whereas  military  conscription  and  “normal  civic  obligations”  are
exceptions  allowed  by  the  1950  European  Declaration  of  Human  Rights,  civilian 
conscription is  likened by many to a  form of  forced labour – prohibited by Article  4.
European case-law on this topic remains to be decisively fixed, and legal uncertainty acts
as  a  deterrent.  Third,  trade-unions  and  volunteer  associations  involved  in  the
departments of activity that would be covered by civilian national or community service
are apt to resent it as unfair competition. Last but not least, if the justification is citizen
duty,  there  is  hardly  any  reason  why  female  citizens  should  be  excluded:  such
discrimination today would lend itself to the charge of sexism, likely to be challenged in
the  courts5.  But  if  females  are  included,  universal  national  service  becomes  an
inordinately expensive proposition involving whole cohorts of 18-to-20 year-olds, to be
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housed, fed, compensated, trained and provided with meaningful tasks… Unsurprisingly,
no  European  country  other  than  Germany  has  dared  face  the  huge  organizational
burdens involved6. In other words, civilian conscription is much harder to legitimize than
the military draft.
10 As a result, despite the obvious risks incurred by the absence of a recruitment safety net,
a shift to all-volunteer force relying on the labour market has in many cases seemed to be
a far simpler solution…
 
How?
11 In most countries, major public debate, in Parliament and in the press, that one would
have  expected  on  a  topic  which  affects  fundamental  liberties  and the  constitutional
balance failed to take place. The debates that surrounded the option of shifting to an AVF
have taken place only among experts and academics. Such was the case in Britain (1957),
Belgium (1992) and France (1996)7. The only major exception, again, has been Germany,
where the Green Party agitates in favour of an AVF, but where the other parties are still
against it. 
12 The issue is openly or tacitly on the table in the countries where the draft has faced
difficulties in adapting to the new strategic and socio-political circumstances; the reason
behind such an intriguing silence is threefold. One aspect relates to the fact that beyond
its  seeming  simplicity,  the  issue  of  conscription  versus  all-volunteer  force  –  as  the
arguments expounded above as to the various solutions to the conundrum do suggest – is
a fearfully complex and technical one: far too much so for the general public to take a
sustained  interest  in  it.  Part  of  that  complexity,  over  and  above  the  socio-political,
economic,  strategic/military  and legal  factors  involved,  probably  has  to  do  with  the
unstated moral rejection of war (and the means it implies) that has been the subtext of
grass-roots attitudes in Europe after 1945. Another aspect is that more often than not the
two rival options cut across the lines that divide ruling from opposition parties: there are
supporters of either in both camps. Fear of political confusion or realignment stops major
parties from advertising their internal differences in public debates.  A final factor in
democracies premised on a Kantian rather than a Lockean/Smithian view of citizenship –
i.e. the whole of Europe minus the British Isles – is the reluctance to let go of a traditional
means of preserving socio-political integration – and of facing the reality that citizenship
norms have been considerably weakened in the last few decades. This was especially the
case in France where the 20th century consensus over conscription was imbued with
sacred value as the traditional way to transcend what (up until the late 1980s) had been
the  otherwise  disconsensual  character  of  French  politics  since  the  Revolution.
Conversely, there are countries, like Sweden, where consensus on conscription (and the
belief that it can adjust to the new external and internal scene) is strong, the very idea of
AVF is anathema, and a major public debate deprived of any relevance.
13 Where silent indecision persists, the issue is resolved by the unexpected move of a ruling
politician of the first rank, or one who aspires for power8. Such was the case in Britain in
1957 when Duncan Sandys,  the then minister of  Defence,  included the return to the
traditional British all-volunteer format in a White Paper without further comment. In
Belgium, the government followed its Defence minister,  Léo Delcroix,  and caught the
military unprepared and scrambling for adjustments to the new organizational format
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(1992). In France, Jacques Chirac, then the newly elected president, went on television in
February 1996 to address the nation and announce his bold move – without warning to
his  Defence  minister,  who  the  previous  week-end  had  been  reassuring  his  German
colleague that France would retain conscription come what may… 
14 Another surprise is that such moves prove immediately popular even in countries that
were supposed to be emotionally attached to the draft. In France, opinion surveys taken
in the days that followed Chirac’s announcement showed that 2/3 of the general public,
and over 4/5 of the youths about to be called up, resoundingly approved. This belied a
widely shared assumption in the political class that public opinion was in two minds at
best9, and eventually would not go along. The strength of citizenship norms had clearly
been overestimated.
15 Transition periods are generally shorter than provided for by laws instituting AVF. In
some few cases, as in Belgium or Spain in the 1990s, it came to nothing as youths about to
be called up refused to respond to the call as soon as they heard of legal provisions to that
effect being processed by Parliament. In the majority of cases, transition is curtailed – in
the Netherlands, it was shortened by half; in France by over a year – (a) because the
recruitment  of  volunteers,  to  begin  with,  proves  surprisingly  much  easier  than
anticipated by Defence ministries, (b) because training and supervising conscripts diverts
officers from concentrating on the wave of the future, but also (c) on account of fears that
attitudes among the last conscripts will deteriorate. 
16 The reason for such initial successes is that many draftees ending their legally mandated
tour of duty can be persuaded to stay on as volunteers, with much better pay. This is
especially the case where or when youth unemployment is high. Another condition is that
the military enjoy a favourable public image, and there be no overly high risks of war:
those two conditions were fulfilled in the 1990s – at the time of the great wave of shifts to
AVF. Action on distant theatres, mostly on peace support operations, added the lure of
adventure  in  the  name  of  peace  and  humanitarian  assistance,  and  the  glamour  of
promoting human rights. Yet, after a few years, these positive factors tend to erode as the
pool of former conscripts dwindles, and labour market forces start making themselves
felt.
 
With What Effects? Structural changes 
17 The most dramatic effect of  the change resides in a severe downsizing of the armed
services. In the strategic circumstances and political atmosphere of the early post-Cold
War era, reductions in force ranged from 25% to 40%. The reason is quite obvious: lower
force level requirements, due to the end of hypothetical prospects of all-out war on the
continent, initiated the process. Moreover, the budgetary cost per head of rank and file
volunteers being distinctly higher than was the case with conscripts10, for a given budget
there is now a lower ceiling to the numbers Defence ministries can afford11. Finally, the
lack of any safety net and a low propensity to enlist among the young set limits, yet to be
tested, to the supply of actual candidates. After a while, the countries that have newly
opted for an AVF begin experiencing the “law of downward pressures” that has become
familiar to the oldest and largest European AVF: that of the United Kingdom, where the
slow but continuous erosion of manpower has been the rule since the 1960s. Due to a
combination of budget constraints and decreasing propensities to enlist,  British force
levels have declined by small numbers every single year since 1963, with the exception of
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the periods 1980-1984, in the context of heightened Soviet threats and the Falklands War,
and 2003-2004, when the second Iraq war started. While seemingly inconsequential in the
short  term,  these  steady  decreases  add  up  to  dramatic  long-term  effects,  forcing
successive  governments  to  revise  manpower  requirements  downwards.  The  really
worrying British trend is that even after requirements have been significantly lowered, as
in the 1990 “Options for Change” strategic review, they still subsequently prove difficult
to meet.  The French case has so far been less problematic:  since 2002 (the first year
without any residual conscripts under the colours), recruitment targets and outcomes
have mostly coincided.  Yet,  the same combination of budget pressures and declining
enlistment propensities may explain why the recent Defence White Paper (Commission
du Livre Blanc, 2008) has counselled decreases of overall manpower requirements by 17%
(Army 17%, Navy 11%, Air Force 24%) phased over the next seven years.
18 The  second  structural  change  resides  in  a  distinct  alteration  of  the  quantitative
equilibrium among the three services. Because a majority of conscripts were formerly
concentrated there, the army is the service most affected by the shift. While navies and
air forces, in which conscripts were already a minority due to the higher technological
requirements  that  have  characterized them  for  decades  (and  the  imprudence  of
entrusting  costly  pieces  of  equipment  to  short-term  conscripts),  see  their  numbers
decrease only very slightly, their shares of total military manpower increase as a result. 
19 The composition of total defence manpower has also significantly changed. The overall
share of military women is raising rapidly, with air forces usually in the vanguard, navies
in the rearguard and armies  in the middle.  The main cause of  such a  trend is  that,
consequent  upon  the  disappearance  of  large  numbers  of  all-male  conscripts,  the
percentage of women will mechanically increase – even if their absolute numbers remain
stagnant. But precisely, in the post-Cold War context, female numbers have gone up by
substantial  margins.  Representing  less  than  2%  in  the  last  two  decades,  they  now
routinely approach or exceed 10 or even 15% of the uniformed workforce. Given recent,
sometimes spectacular, inflows of women recruits (in France, over 20%; in Britain, close
to 15%), their visibility and functional significance promises to rise further still in the
medium  term.  Permissive  reasons  are  the  normative  change  which,  in  the  parent
societies, has favoured greater gender equality of access to most specialties and positions,
and the fact  that  in contemporary armed forces,  a  majority  of  roles  do not  directly
involve  combat,  or  require  above  average  bodily  vigour.  The  main  factor,  however,
generally is the dearth of quality male applicants prepared to face the requirements of
military life (open-ended liability for service, discipline, long separations from family,
commitment to theatres of operations where, however statistically minimal, the risk to
life and limb, dramatized by media reporting whenever there are casualties, is not nil).
Women, whose average level of educational attainment is known to exceed that of men,
conveniently substitute for the missing male candidates, thus making the need for pay
raises less acute. The only drawback of female recruits is that – though access to positions
hitherto closed to them is widening – they are still barred from some combat roles, hence
slightly less versatile than men.
20 Proportions  (though not  necessarily  absolute  numbers)  of  civilian personnel  likewise
increase to the point where, in some countries (e.g., Britain), their aggregate strength
surpasses that of the largest uniformed service. As many support functions, following the
public-private partnership trend typical of the 1990s, have been outsourced to private
sector firms, the visibility of civilians is even greater than official statistics allow for.
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21 Where allowed by law (Britain, France, Spain, and a few others), foreign volunteers, once
concentrated in homogeneous foreign formations (Gurkhas,  Legion,  etc.)  of  otherwise
national armies now tend to fill the ranks of many other units or branches. In Britain,
where  recruiting from the  Commonwealth (and Ireland)  has  long been customary,  a
recent rise in the proportion of foreigners among “other ranks” (to nearly 8% overall, but
20% of new recruits this year) has prompted fears that soaring numbers of foreign troops
would dilute the armed forces’ national identity, possibly weaken loyalty, and – should
countries  of  origin ban their  citizens from fighting Britain’s  wars –  seriously cripple
military operations (Hickley and Kisiel, 2008). In Spain, large numbers of Latin American
immigrants join the forces upon the promise of naturalization (as is the case also in the
United States),  which somewhat allays such fears.  In dire situations,  when the worst
comes to the worst and such diversification is not enough to fill the ranks, some countries
do not hesitate in recruiting convicted prison detainees upon the promise of pardon after
a tour of combat duty12.
22 At the same, second-generation immigrants tend to flock to the ranks of European all-
volunteer forces in greater numbers than their fathers had consented to. They do so, in
ways that parallel the African-American experience in the U. S. military from the 1950s to
the 1980s, in order to earn subjective recognition and “first-class citizenship” by serving
in  a  demanding  public  institution  –  one  in  which  brotherhood  of  arms,  equality  of
treatment,  and  the  close  watch  kept  by  the  media,  civil  liberties  or  human  rights
organizations  guarantee  that  the  discrimination  they  still  suffer  in  society  will  be
mitigated and softened. The sum total is that for the armed forces the era when they were
a white male preserve is a thing of the past: in a matter of years after the shift to an AVF,
they acquire a cosmopolitan, “rainbow” quality13.
23 The  reserves  also  go  through  a  deep  transformation,  from  understudy  formations
replicating  active-duty  order-of-battle  charts  to  a  pool  of  specialist  operational  or
support  roles  or  units  which it  would  be  too  costly  to  maintain  on  active  status
permanently.  All  reservists  are  now volunteers:  they  are  thus  as  hard  to  recruit  as
regulars14, and their cost per head has risen. As a result, the reserves too are severely
downsized15 – at least as far as operational reservists (those liable to be mobilized and
committed to military action) are concerned. However, numbers tend to rise again over
time as a consequence of the successive reductions in regular force. For instance, the
French operational reserve now barely totals 1/6th of regular force levels, but is slated to
exceed 40% by 2015. 
24 Likewise, the services’ rank structure is profoundly altered. The old pyramid is replaced
overnight by a hierarchical set-up in which privates and corporals or equivalents are no
longer necessarily a majority – a trend that predated the shift to an AVF in navies and air
forces but now tends to apply overall (tough in army privates may, in some cases, still
account for slightly over 50%). This results from the fact that a large share of officers and
NCO are in highly-skilled specialist roles which do not coincide with command positions.
It has also to do with anticipation of emergency situations which could require sudden
increases in the overall volume of troops. As experienced senior officers and NCO cannot
be recruited and trained overnight for such contingencies, a surplus of them is prudently
kept  on the  rolls.  However,  over  time,  as  more  specialist  positions  are  entrusted to
civilian defence personnel or subcontractors, the proportion, but not the numbers, of
outsourcing tends to rise again somewhat.
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25 If one adds the consideration that troop turnover is slower among volunteers signed up
for  a  few  years  than  it  was  among  short-term conscripts,  and  that  downsizing  has
reduced the number of companies or battalions to command, ships to sail or aircraft to
fly, one consequence is that the pace of promotion tends to be slower in AVF than it was
in the days of conscription both at the bottom and at the top. In the middle, among mid-
ranking officers and NCO, careers are more often oriented to specialist functions. Another
consequence is the possible rise of relative deprivation among sergeants or equivalents,
whose pay differentials with privates has been reduced (sometimes considerably, due to
the steep initial rise in recruit pay), and who tend to be frustrated as a result of this
flattening of the pay structure.
26 With rank and file volunteers staying on for longer periods, the age structure undergoes a
similar flattening, and the average age immediately rises from 24-25 to slightly above 30.
The number (and more markedly, the proportion) of both married service members and
dependents  increases,  generating  higher  family  welfare  costs  which  now  take  up  a
significant proportion of the defence budget. The same will apply to retirement pensions
at a later date.
27 The final structural change affects the allocation of scarce resources in times of budget
constraints. Higher personnel costs induce a trade-off with provision of major items of
equipment – with maintenance and spare parts as the designated victims of that fearful
dilemma16.
 
Recruitment, resettlement and retention 
28 The  shift  does  not  affect  the recruitment  of  military  by  career,  which  was
professionalized  (except  for  a  few conscripted  second lieutenants  or  sergeants)  long
before it. For any AVF, absent the safety net of a legally mandated duty to serve, the key
to success or failure resides in recruiting enough rank and file volunteers, especially in
countries where young NCO are not recruited (as is the case in France) directly from
civilian life.
29 Given deliberately low force level requirements, the problem stems from supply factors
which are often beyond the control of military authorities. One is the size and evolution
of cohorts of 17-24 year-olds17. Another is the proportion of youths in that age bracket
who  intend  to  pursue  post-secondary  studies,  and  are  therefore  unavailable.  That
proportion  has  increased  in  the  last  decades  to  the  point  where,  in  most  European
countries, it exceeds 25%, and in some approaches 50% or more. Physical inaptitude or
medical rejection rates of enlistment candidates have grown to be a distinct problem
(they were close to 40% in the British services in the late 1990s), due to lifestyles in which
physical exercise is less of a mainstream value than it used to be among the young. The
net  result  is  that  the  pool  of  potential  candidates  is  severely  restricted.  While  the
numbers of young male recruits needed by the services may seem modest as a proportion
of  the  youth  cohorts  concerned,  once  those  in  post-secondary  education  and the
proportion of the remainder that is declared physically ineligible are deducted from that
total, the share of eligible young men the services need to attract appears much higher. In
Britain, for instance, some 25,000 rank and file new recruits, i.e. 0,5%, or 1 in 200 young
males of the 17-24 year-old cohorts, are required every year; but among those eligible and
available for service, that number fully amounts to over 8%, or 1 in 1218. There is thus, in
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addition to the budgetary cap to the numbers that can be recruited, a natural ceiling
which actually represents the AVF main constraint. If that is the case, the question then is
of the factors and motivations that govern willingness to serve among those eligible and
available for enlistment.
30 Though economic utilitarianism plays less of a role than is commonly assumed, youth
unemployment rates obviously affect decisions to apply for enlistment at rank and file
level19. So does the political context: wars are known to attract more recruits to begin
with, but if they drag on the armed forces’ attractiveness decreases. Conversely, peace
support missions, because they are in harmony with contemporary mainstream civilian
values, tend to raise the self-esteem of those who take part in them, and – all things equal
– attract more people to the military services. The prestige status of the military also
forms part of the recruitment equation – as it happens, on the positive side since the end
of the Cold War.
31 Among the factors that can be managed by governments and armed forces, pay, career
prospects, conditions of service, post-service resettlement and public image loom largest.
For senior officers and highly-skilled specialists20, pay is usually a problem but not for
rank and file service members. These ones can compare their lots with that of civilian
friends at corresponding skill levels and find that military allowances and bonuses place
their compensation package above the median income in their segment of the labour
market. That is because, in order to be attractive, the armed forces need to factor in the
peculiar burdens of military service, and the recognition that such service deserves in
societies where few are willing to serve. As suggested by elasticities that are fairly low
when it is augmented but greater whenever it decreases in real terms, pay mostly plays a
role in enlistment motivations, therefore, only when it is seen as insufficient – a suicidal
situation for any AVF.
32 Career prospects and conditions of service are actually more important. Most AVF favour
renewable contracts  of  medium length rather than short,  non-renewable ones.  Their
main source of weakness in the face of competitors on the labour market is that they
cannot  guarantee  every  recruit  long-term employment  leading to  NCO status,  which
means that a majority will have to leave the services after a few years. To offset that
handicap, they play up adventure, travel, the chance to break with the tedium of civilian
routines,  the warm-hearted solidarity of primary groups,  a structured and protective
social environment, or the assets for second (civilian) careers of technical training much
in demand in industry. The problem is that conditions of service often fall short of those
promises. As the case may be, boredom, the feeling that skills and good will are under-
utilized,  the  stark  realities  of  military  action,  repeated  tours  on  distant  theatres  of
operations often lead to disappointment, individual maladjustment and demoralization
or sheer fatigue, reflected in problematic levels of premature separation from service –
unfinished non-prior service contracts – ranging from 10 to 30% and over depending on
country and circumstances.
33 That  is  why  resettlement  prospects  are  key  to  success.  Support  in  helping  service
members  find  suitable  civilian  jobs  upon  leaving  the  forces  (through  occupational
training, outplacement, or counselling) is of cardinal importance as negative hearsay is
quick to produce deleterious feedback effects on recruitment. But equally significant is
helping  them  re-adjust  to  civilian  norms,  especially  where,  as  in  the  British  Army,
emphasis  on  military  ethos,  cohesion  and  paternalism  is  strong.  Nothing  depresses
recruitment so much as media reporting that thirty-year-old former service members,
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maladjusted to civilian life because they miss the protective family atmosphere of service
life, are over-represented among the unemployed, homeless people or prison inmates21.
34 Finally, the image projected by each service plays a very significant role. If all of the
above factors  impacted indiscriminately on willingness  to serve,  recruits  in all  three
services would display similar characteristics,  or to put it another way, the choice of
service would be a matter of indifference to them. This is not the case, and the services
soon discover  that  they each have their  own markets, based on differences  in  their
respective  images  in  the  minds  of  potential  candidates:  virility,  adventure,  physical
exertion and solidarity  for  armies,  technology and travel  for  navies,  technology and
mastery  of  complexity  for  air  forces.  That  is  why  recruitment  advertising,  which
represents a significant share of budget expenditures, is targeted at niches rather than at
the youth labour market in blanket fashion. Contrary to common perceptions, including
among recruiters, enlistment in the armed services, therefore, is not a choice by default.
35 Outcomes are fairly similar across countries. Rank and file recruits predominantly come
from lower-middle and working-class backgrounds. Among them, over-represented are
school  drop-outs  who,  in  addition  to  the  benefits  in  terms  of  personal  identity  and
satisfaction of certain wishes or psychological drives, see the armed services as a second
chance. Hence the importance for the armed forces to be (and clearly appear to be) an
avenue of upward mobility for such youths as well as (though in different ways) for sons
and daughters of immigrants – rather than as a welfare refuge, or employer of last resort,
for youths in need of resocialization. 
36 In  the  face  of  such  recruitment  difficulties,  retention  is  the  second  key  to  success.
Keeping  first-term  attrition  to  a  minimum  and  encouraging  renewal  of  contracts
compensates for recruitment shortfalls, keeps turnover low, and saves on training. This is
a standard response to the structural risk of understaffing. However, as we shall see, it
has drawbacks. 
 
Institutional impact 
37 A little-noticed consequence of the shift to an AVF is a liberalization of leadership styles.
One general reason is increased complexity,  which to a large extent makes superiors
dependent on the good will of subordinates. While it is true that such a trend is also felt
in armed forces that still partly rely on conscription, its repercussions are much stronger
in AVF because the performance of superiors is now assessed, at least in part, on the basis
of their ability to elicit contract renewals among their subordinates. Another reason is
the less pyramidal rank structure already alluded to, and shorter social distances between
NCO and privates. This is less in evidence, however, in elite army units where the gap
between the social origins of officers and other ranks is larger, and command authority is
more functional than elsewhere.
38 A second impact resides in the cultural change that comes from the increased presence
and visibility of servicewomen and minorities. However, much more fundamental is the
exacerbation  in  AVF  of  cultural  tensions,  natural  to  military  institutions,  between
identities based on the requirements of operational effectiveness and those induced by
the need for meaningful integration into the parent societies. On the one hand, martial
identities are hardened by a social composition that is less representative than in was
under the draft,  by the cultural  in-breeding that  an AVF induces,  the post-Cold War
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return to a strategy of action, high operational tempos, long separations from family, as
well as by the outsourcing of support functions and resulting concentration of uniformed
personnel on core military activities. The restoration, from the early 1990s onwards, of
high prestige after a three-decade eclipse – surveys now regularly place the military
among the most respected public institutions in most European countries, irrespective of
organizational formats22 – encourages the hardening of those facets of military identity
which earn service members that heightened societal regard. On the other hand, the fact
that  everything  in  AVF  has  a  price-tag  –  in  sharp  contrast  with  the  old  days  of
conscription, when rank and file labour was abundant and cheap – encourages resort to
management techniques that nothing differentiates from those in use elsewhere.  The
consequence is that occupationalism – the attitude which holds that service is a job like
any other – is now a higher risk in some quarters than before. Market philosophies and
the ideological belief that public-private partnerships are more efficient – so typical of
the post-Cold War era until recently – have made it more difficult for the military to
maintain  its  functional  ethos.  Also,  despite  the  return  of  low-intensity  warfare
(Afghanistan)  among  their  missions,  the  winning  of  the  hearts  and  minds  of  local
populations on distant  theatres  involves civilian skills  and universal  values;  likewise,
increased interaction with  civilian  employees,  the  desire  of  military  families  to  lead
“normal”  lives,  and the  close  cultural  integration of  military  cadres  into  the  parent
societies, tend to point the other way. Simultaneous remilitarization and civilianisation of
attitudes  and  ethos  result  in  what  some  acute  observers  have  called  “military
schizophrenia”23.
 
Socio-political impact 
39 In light of such trends, two concerns come to the fore. One, voiced by civilians, is to avoid
a military staffed by the underprivileged in the rank and file, and the privileged in the
officer corps, both culturally (not least, ideologically) estranged from mainstream society.
The other, often heard in military circles, is to preclude societal indifference towards the
armed services.
40 The civilian concern is groundless today. For one thing, “automatic stabilizers” operate at
rank and file level: complexity prevents the military from being content to recruit solely
among the low-skilled,  underprivileged or ideologically motivated. If  it  did,  its public
image would become skewed, and fail to attract mainstream youths, thus exacerbating its
recruitment  problems.  Officers  have  for  the  past  three  decades  or  more  been  fairly
representative socially, as well as become meaningfully integrated into society in terms of
family lifestyles, and there is no sign that this is about to change unless the parameters
are fundamentally altered. For another, AVF are much more closely dependent on society
for material and moral support than they were in the days of abundant, cheap and legally
guaranteed conscript labour. However, the risk exists of a deterioration of the existing
state of affairs. The conjunction of still lower manpower requirements and high youth
unemployment would most certainly disturb the automatic stabilizers alluded to,  and
allow  social  and  cultural/ideological  estrangement  (as  well  as  loss  of  functional
effectiveness  through  a  lowering  of  average  manpower  quality!).  The  military’s
preference for  retention through long,  renewable  contracts  would accentuate such a
negative trend24. The elitization of officer corps entailed by low numbers would lengthen
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social  distances with other ranks,  and bring back authoritarian leadership styles – in
contradiction to wider societal trends. Vigilance is thus required. 
41 The military  concern is  more serious.  Lower  force  levels  and numerous  missions  on
distant theatres translate into much less visible forces at home. No longer in the public
eye,  they run the risk of  being forgotten,  despite the heightened prestige they have
earned in the last two decades – with serious consequences on recruitment, or when it
comes  to  budget  debates.  Constant  public  relations  efforts  are  therefore  necessary,
especially at local level. Avoidance of bad press, due to scandals25 or statistics on former
service members now homeless or in jail, is of the essence. One good way of securing a
favourable public image is to cultivate the perception of the defence establishment as an
avenue of upward mobility. 
42 The political dimension follows much the same pattern, though it is moot whether that
state of affairs follows entirely from the new organizational format: it pre-dated the shift
among cadres, and there are counter-examples outside Europe – notably in the United
States. But it is clear that rather than “radical professionalism”, all-volunteer formats in
European countries  have  accentuated  “pragmatic”  orientations  –  i.e.,  non-ideological
conservatism premised on the  defence  of  existing  institutions  whatever  the  political
options of those in office at national level. This is reflected, again unlike the U. S.26, in the
absence of  open partisanship among military personnel:  while the political  centre of
gravity is slightly right of centre, the full spectrum of political attitudes (with the possible
exception of extreme-left views) can usually be observed in European military settings.
Generally recognized and accepted is the need for accommodating both the functional
imperative of unique norms and the socio-political imperative of closeness to the social
environment – for being distinct, but not distant from society. There are, as could be
expected, those (usually in the combat arms of armies) who regard themselves as soldiers
first and foremost and cultivate traditional martial identities, but a majority, when asked
in interviews or questionnaire surveys, say they are citizens as well as soldiers.
43 This  precludes  praetorian  attitudes,  facilitates  interaction  at  the  top  between ruling
politicians  and military  leaders,  and mitigates  frustration at  the  loss  of  professional
autonomy whenever political goals change or override military objectives in action or
policy. European military leaders are more often than not more politically flexible than
their U. S. counterparts. 
44 At  the  same time,  this  makes  for  less  politically  inhibited  officers,  unafraid  to  play
political games whenever frustration grows out of control. This notably happens, as has
been observed in many countries, when military leaders (and their subordinates) feel that
politicians at the top do not sufficiently take their professional viewpoints into account
when formulating policy. And indeed, under the Cold War, politicians had formed the
habit of making decisions on defence, for instance using military expenditures as a major
adjustment variable in economic policy, without consulting generals or admirals whose
counsel, in the absence of operations, could be dispensed with. Repeated incidents over
the last fifteen years (resignations, public protests by flag rank officers in the press, etc.)
conspicuously show that this will not do any more, especially as in terms or prestige and
public respect, the differentials between military leaders and politicians today are clearly
in favour of the former in most European countries27. Another factor is that, whereas in
the days of the draft the presence of citizens in arms serving with little at stake in terms
of economic reward or identity interests discouraged cadres from publicly articulating
such claims, they now feel freer to act as pressure groups28. A final factor resides in the
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dwindling  proportion  of  civilian  elites  (politicians,  but  also  ranking  bureaucrats,
journalists, teachers and others) with first-hand experience of military life after several
decades of all-volunteer recruitment – a serious source of potential misunderstanding for
the future (witness the U.S. case) between them and service members.
 
Concluding remarks 
45 All-volunteer  armed  forces  are  a  growing  majority  in  Europe.  In  the strategic
circumstances that have prevailed since the Berlin Wall went down, conscription has only
survived in nations where citizenship norms have suffered less than they generally have
elsewhere, or are still in the throes of unresolved tensions or threats on the periphery.
The shift came as a surprise in a few key countries soon after 1990, triggering a dramatic
bandwagon effect which has since considerably altered the military scene throughout the
continent. 
46 Transitions have been much easier than expected. Defence establishments have in the
main shown great skills in negotiating the deep structural changes that come with such a
major turning point. Initial recruitment figures allayed the fears expressed by military
leaders used to the safety net of conscription. But soon, the law of downward pressures
has made itself felt, and the hard realities of managing AVF have set in. The main obstacle
inheres in pools of eligible and potentially willing young men that are too limited to fill
the ranks. Part of the problem is that the services can guarantee promotion and secure
long-term employment only to a minority. Women are used in rising numbers to fill the
gap (and ensure  quality),  and some countries  faced with  serious  shortfalls  resort  to
enlisting foreigners or even prisoners upon the promise of  naturalization or pardon.
Managers  soon  learn  the  importance  for  the  armed  forces  not  to  appear  to  be  an
employer of last resort, and understand that resettlement and the prospect of upward
social mobility upon leaving the services help recruitment. They come to value retention
as a key substitute for scarce new recruits. 
47 AVF impact on military identities.  Leadership styles become more liberal,  and labour
market realities induce management practices which erode the old normative character
of martial institutions. Military culture registers the change in social composition, most
visibly the increased presence of servicewomen. The basic tensions that undergird it are
heightened by the shift. Remilitarization, partly due to the new strategic context, and
increased civilianisation trends result in uneasy compromises or unresolved policy, social
or even psychological contradictions.
48 The shift to an AVF carries important consequences for society at large. It comes about in
part on account of weakened citizenship norms, and further weakens them. It brings to
the fore concerns about social  and cultural  isolation and estrangement of  the armed
forces. These fears prove mostly ungrounded thanks to “automatic stabilizers”, sure to
operate as long as manpower requirements go beyond the narrow segment of youths
spontaneously inclined to join for social, cultural or ideological reasons, and oblige the
services to recruit from the mainstream. The military’s main problem is to be kept in the
public  eye  and,  despite  the  respect  and prestige  earned the  last  two decades,  avoid
societal indifference. For that purpose, they are brought to reach out to society through
advertising, open days or sponsoring of leisure activities. 
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49 Finally, the political dimension is less problematic in Europe today than it would have
been in other historical contexts (say, in the 1920s and 1930s), or than it is in America.
The  reason  for  this  is  that  the  shift has  confirmed  and  deepened  the  pragmatic
professionalism of earlier decades. This makes for more flexibility on the part of officers
in their  relations with ministers,  parliamentarians and civilian bureaucrats.  If  it  also
encourages  them  to  play  political  games,  their  pressure  group  tactics  have  so  far
remained well within the bounds of democratic practice, and underline their loyalty to
the system. However, civilian-military misunderstandings are made more likely by reason
of the lack, growing as a function of time, of any first-hand experience of military life
among civilian elites. 
50 One consequence seldom brought up is that, with dwindling numbers and the attendant
risk of pricing military action out of battlefields, AVF encourage the internationalisation
of security through joint operations or institutional arrangements: even major powers
have come to realize that there is little they can do alone. Likewise, they have, by sheer
necessity, greatly boosted the trend towards closer inter-service cooperation brought on
by the post-Cold War strategic context.
51 All in all, then, all-volunteer forces are neither the resplendent success nor the disaster
that some had predicted. Despite the inherent difficulties detailed in this article, they
valiantly survive, and mostly give satisfaction in their conduct of the missions assigned to
them as well as in relations with state and society.
52 There are, however, two bold question marks today and for the future. As exemplified by
Iraq  and  Afghanistan  today,  one  is  sustainability:  all-volunteer  formats  turn  force
regeneration in the field into a major difficulty, with no satisfactory solution in sight. And
should major international  tensions re-emerge and require substantially higher force
levels, reverting to conscription would most probably be the only way.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BURK, J. (1992), «The Decline of Mass Armed Forces and Compulsory Military Service», Defense
Analysis, 8, pp. 45-49.
COMISSION DU LIVRE BLANC (2008), Défense et sécurité nationale: le Livre Blanc, Paris, Odile Jacob/
La Documentation française.
DOORN, J. (1975), The Soldier and Social Change, Beverly Hills, Sage. 
HICKLEY, M. and R. Kisiel, (2008), “Army’s demand for 15% limit on foreign recruits to safeguard 
Britishness upsets race watchdog”, in Daily Mail, 26 September. 
JANOWITZ, M. (1971 [1960]), The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, Glencoe, Free
Press. 
KELLEHER, C. (1978), “Mass Armies in the 1970s: The Debate in Western Europe”, Armed Forces &
Society, 5, pp. 3-30.
Shifting to All-Volunteer Armed Forces in Europe: Why, How, With What Effects?
Forum Sociológico, 19 | 2009
14
MARTIN, M. (1977), “Conscription and the Decline of the Mass Army in France, 1960-1975”, Armed
Forces & Society, 3, pp. 355-406.
MARTIN, M. (1981), “Le déclin de l’armée de masse en France: Notes sur quelques paramètres
organisationnels”, Revue française de sociologie, 22, pp.87-116.
NOTES
1. “Why me?” is the question asked when service is seen as a burden. Where, due to ingrained
cultural patterns, service is still regarded as an honour, the question is “Why not me?”. Such rare
cases can still be observed in Scandinavia, where, owing to the Lutheran tradition of exalting
service to the community, conscripts enjoy high social honour, and youths tend to feel deprived
when exempted from service. To illustrate: in Sweden, recently, feminist militants have been
campaigning for the extension of conscript duty to young females. 
2. Other factors may compensate for, or even contradict, this hypothetical trend. Such was the
case, for instance in the last years of conscription in France, where despite its obvious unequal
impact  on  various  social  groups  (legal  evasion  was  strongest  among  both  the  most
underprivileged and privileged in terms of aptitudes and educational attainment, while the draft
affected all others more than proportionately), draftees declared that service was meaningful to
them, and responded positively to call-ups until the very end. 
3. Lotteries to designate those in the minority who will be called up were common practice in the
19th century, but mostly disappeared in the 20th: equality gained strength as a value, and made
consensus over unequal treatment of equals much harder to come by all things equal. 
4. Germany introduced such a  system in the first  place because conscientious objection is  a
German citizen’s constitutional right, and in the name of equality it had to provide a mandatory
civilian alternative to conscripted military service. When, in the 1990s, conscientious objection
became  the  majority  option  among  youths  of  draft  age,  such  cheap  manpower created  an
addiction  that  is  difficult  to  remedy  without  renouncing  its  obvious  economic  and  political
advantages for the welfare system…
5. This is another reason why Germany sticks to the military draft even though only a minority
are now affected by it: only males are concerned. Females were long barred from serving in the
Bundeswehr, and therefore conscientious objection, the main driver of Zivildienst applications,
does not affect them. 
6. Some have instituted volunteer forms of civilian service, which in most cases only attract tiny
minorities among the targeted youth population. 
7. The situation in the United States (1966-1969) was very similar. 
8. In  America,  Richard  Nixon,  then  campaigning  for  his  party’s  nomination  in  the  1968
presidential race, surprised everybody – he had been known as a staunch supporter of universal
military training as Eisenhower’s vice-president a decade or so earlier – by including a return to
an all-volunteer military in his platform. Once elected, he appointed a presidential commission
to think through and organize the shift. 
9. In the years preceding the announcement, opinion surveys regularly showed that some 2/3 of
respondents believed that France could not do without conscription, but about 3/4 added that an
all-professional force would be more effective… 
10. Conscript pay levels ranged from the minimum wage to as low as 10% of it. By contrast, under
new AVF in many countries, labour market rates for quality manpower at rank and file level had
to be supplemented by bonuses and allowances to compensate for the potential hardships of
military life. 
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11. This was especially the case in the 1990s, when peace dividends were the order of the day.
The post-9/11 era hardly changed the equation: while downward defence budget trends were
reversed, the increments were mostly allocated to resources other than force levels. 
12. That has been the case recently in the United States: see, for instance: TURSE, N. (2006), “U.?
S. is recruiting misfits for army: felons, racists, gang members fill in the ranks”, San Francisco
Chronicle, Sunday, October 1, 2006; p. F-6. This extreme solution has been examined in Britain, for
the same reasons, but applied on a much lesser scale. 
13. This  is  of  course  more in  evidence in  former imperial  powers  than in  Central  European
countries. 
14. If not harder actually, as civilian employers are generally reluctant to allow employees to
leave their positions temporarily in order to respond to a call to military training periods or
distant operations. 
15. It is true, however, that the huge reserves formerly generated by conscription existed mostly
on paper, and were seldom called to the colours. 
16. The dearth of spare parts and maintenance funds was particularly acute in Britain and France
earlier this decade. See LOGAN, G., “Veterans blame Army for massed ranks of ex-soldiers in UK
jails”, Personneltoday.com, 5 September 2008.
17. One further difficulty stems from the demographic decline affecting regions or segments of
the population which traditionally generate more enlistments than others (in Britain: Northern
England, Scotland and the industrial working-class).
18. By comparison, the same proportion is 1 in 83 for young women, in whose case the limiting
factor is not supply but institutional demand. One does not wonder, therefore, if that demand
increases the way it does at present. 
19. However, the elasticities of recruitment as a function of youth unemployment are generally
weak, and labour market influences are registered with a time-lag of at least six months. Such
influences  are  complex,  and  involve  many  intervening  variables.  Unemployment  impacts  on
quality  more  than  on  numbers  of  applicants,  as  if  the  least  qualified  withdrew  from  the
enlistment  market  based on the  perception that  better  profiles  will  reduce  their  chances  of
success. 
20. This was already the case before the shift to AVF, and is therefore unrelated to it (though
indirectly, the rise in the expenditures allocated to rank and file pay makes pay raises for senior
and highly-skilled personnel more problematic for budget managers).
21. This has plagued the British Armed Forces over the last few years through press report upon
press report that the unemployment rate of former service members is nearly double the general
rate,  or  that  some  20%  of  homeless  persons  in  the  London  area  and  9%  of  the  UK prison
population are ex-servicemen. On this last point, see for instance: Logan (2008), “Veterans blame
Army for massed ranks of ex-soldiers in UK jails”, Personneltoday.com, 5 September 2008.
22. Cf. successive edition of Eurobarometer surveys. 
23. The best example of this was the French military’s response to the law instituting a 35-hour
workweek in street as from 2000. On the basis of its legal status, military authorities (but also a
vocal majority among service members) proclaimed that it was not concerned, and open-ended
liability  for  service  remained  central  to  the  military  ethos.  Yet,  in  a  matter  of  months,  the
military came up with its own modified version of the 35-hour workweek: while the principle of
unlimited availability for duty was upheld, if nothing urgent was on the front burner, battalion
or  base  commanders  could  now allow their  subordinates  to  take  Friday  afternoons  off.  The
rationale was that civilian defence employees enjoyed the benefit of the new law, and it was
necessary  to  avoid  relative  deprivation  among  uniformed  personnel  as  well  as  among  their
families.  Thus  did  two  cardinal  principles  collide:  functional  effectiveness  and  socio-cultural
integration, which though often pointing in different directions must never be lost sight of. But
in this case, harmonization between them proved difficult, and led to an uneasy compromise. 
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24. All-volunteer formats and ideological conservatism seem related only when long careers or
extended  periods  of  service  in  uniform  are  dominant.  This  was  suggested  long  ago  by  an
American study:  controlling for  education,  among service members conservative views are a
positive function of seniority, or of plans to remain in the armed services for as long as possible.
The study’s authors advised caution in maintaining a balance between long- and short-termers –
despite, one might add, the understandable preference of personnel managers for retention and
low turnover.  Cf.  BACHMAN, J.;  J.  Blair and D.  Segal (1977),  The All-Volunteer  Force:  A Study of
Ideology in the Military, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
25. The  usual  instances  concern  hazing  of  new  recruits,  racial  discrimination  or  sexual
harassment.
26. Another, more recent, American study showed that nearly 2/3 of U.?S. officers are registered
Republicans.  Cf.  HICKLEY,  M.  and R.  Kisiel  (2008),  “Army’s  demand for  15% limit  on foreign
recruits to safeguard Britishness upsets race watchdog”, Daily Mail, 26 September. This is bound to
raise problems as liberal democracy is premised on the notion of objective neutrality on the part
of those serving the state.
27. Eurobarometer, loc. cit. 
28. This  is  clearest  in  the  French  case,  where  gendarmes  have  been  known  to  stage  street
protests in uniform recently (2001). But, confirming that this is not necessarily related to AVF,
Swedish  military  cadres,  while  refraining  from  taking  to  the  streets,  have  become  adept  at
publicly negotiating benefits and allowances before accepting overseas missions.
ABSTRACTS
Countries with conscripted troops became a minority since the end of the Cold War. In this new
reality it is essential to understand why the shift to all-volunteer forces happened, how occurred
and the impacts caused in European societies.  Large number of troops became pointless,  the
service was now seen as a burden and different types of military action implied a new system.
Public debate has not taken place, mainly occurring among experts. In general the transition
periods are shorter than the ones determined by law. There are several kinds of impacts in this
change: structural changes (e.g. downsizing of the armed services and distinct alterations among
the  three  services);  recruitment,  resettlement  and  retention;  institutional  impact  (e.g.
liberalization of leadership styles and the cultural change caused by the increased presence of
servicewomen  and  minorities);  and  socio-political  impact.  AVF  still  need  to  respond  to  the
sustainability issue and to the need of higher force levels.
Desde o fim da Guerra Fria os países com tropas recrutadas tornaram-se uma minoria. É essencial
compreender o porquê da mudança para forças exclusivamente voluntárias, como ocorreu e os
impactos nas sociedades europeias. Um grande número de tropas torna-se inútil, o serviço passou
a ser visto como um fardo e diferentes tipos de acção militar implicam um novo sistema. O debate
público não se verificou e só ocorre entre especialistas. Em geral, os períodos de transição são
mais  curtos do que o determinado por lei.  Existem vários  tipos de impactos desta mudança:
estruturais  (como  a  redução  das  forças  armadas  e  alterações  distintas  entre  os  três  ramos);
recrutamento, reinstalação e retenção; impacto institucional (como a liberalização dos estilos de
liderança e a mudança cultural causada pelo aumento da presença de mulheres e minorias), e
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impacto sociopolítico. AVF (Forças Armadas Voluntárias) ainda precisam de responder à questão
da sustentabilidade e da necessidade de maiores níveis de força.
INDEX
Keywords: All-Volunteer Forces, military service, change effects, sustainability
Palavras-chave: Forças Armadas Voluntárias, serviço militar, efeitos da mudança,
sustentabilidade
AUTHOR
BERNARD BOENE
Reitor da Académie de la Réunion, Professor na Université de Rennes II b.boene@online.fr
Shifting to All-Volunteer Armed Forces in Europe: Why, How, With What Effects?
Forum Sociológico, 19 | 2009
18
